Taking Mistakes Seriously by Larkin, Paul J., Jr.
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 28 | Issue 1 Article 3
7-1-2013
Taking Mistakes Seriously
Paul J. Larkin Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, and the
Legal Theory Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul J. Larkin Jr., Taking Mistakes Seriously, 28 BYU J. Pub. L. 71 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol28/iss1/3
LARKIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2014 11:45 AM 
 
71 
Taking Mistakes Seriously 
Paul J. Larkin, Jr.∗ 
CONTENTS 
 
I.  MISTAKES THAT ARE PUNISHED: THE MISTAKE-OF-LAW 
DOCTRINE IN THE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW .............  73 
II.  MISTAKES THAT ARE FORGIVEN: THE REASONABLE-
MISTAKE, QUALIFIED-IMMUNITY, AND HARMLESS-
ERROR DOCTRINES  .............................................................   82 
A.  The Reasonable-Mistake Exception to the Exclusion-
ary Rule   ..........................................................................  83 
B.  The Qualified-Immunity Doctrine ..................................  89 
C.  The Harmless-Error Doctrine .........................................  94 
III.  RECONCILING PUNISHMENT WITH FORGIVENESS..............  100 
A.  Examining the Rationales for the Different Rules .........  101 
1.  Everyone knows the criminal law .............................  102 
2.  Everyone should know the criminal law ................... 105 
3.  Necessity .................................................................... 107 
B.  Comparing Apples with Apples or with Oranges? .........  110 
IV.  CONCLUSION .........................................................................   115 
 
 
 
 
* Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Senior Legal Research Fellow, the Heritage Foundation; M.P.P. 2010 
George Washington University; J.D. 1980 Stanford Law School; B.A. 1977 Washington & Lee 
University. The views expressed in this Article are my own and should not be construed as rep-
resenting any official position of The Heritage Foundation. I want to thank Tom Buchanan, 
Daniel Dew, Tom DiBiagio, Andrew Kloster, Jeff Lamken, and Greg Maggs for helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this Article. Any remaining errors are mine. 
  In the interest of full disclosure, I would like to note that I was counsel for a party or 
amicus in several cases discussed below: Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); Ratzlaf v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Illinois v. Krull, 480 
U.S. 340 (1987); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986); and Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 
(1986). 
LARKIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2014  11:45 AM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 28 
72 
Mistakes happen. Some are avoidable, but not all. Some result 
from human error; some when a system suffers a mechanical break-
down or exhaustion. Some are inevitable, if not predictable (at least in 
gross); others are flukes. Some happen regularly; others appear once in 
a blue moon. Some are harmless; some are fatal. Because mistakes 
come in different shapes and sizes, it is no surprise that the legal system 
deals with them in different ways. Some may never be forgiven, some 
may always be excused, and most fall in between.1 
What is a surprise is that the law treats mistakes by private parties 
in a categorically different manner than mistakes by government offi-
cials. A private party who reasonably and honestly believes that he has 
complied with the law generally cannot assert as a defense to a criminal 
charge that he may have made a mistake, but did not intend to commit 
a crime. The criminal law generally does not recognize a reasonable, 
honest mistake as grounds for exonerating someone charged with a 
crime. By contrast, the law is quite forgiving when law enforcement 
officers, prosecutors, or judges make mistakes. Three different doc-
trines—the reasonable-mistake exception to the exclusionary rule, the 
qualified-immunity doctrine, and the harmless-error doctrine—all ex-
ist to forgive reasonable, honest mistakes by one or more government 
officials involved in the criminal justice process. 
On its face, that difference is quite striking. The law often treats 
government officials differently than private parties, but the principal 
difference is that the Constitution limits the actions of the former, not 
the latter.2 There also are circumstances in which the law forgives a 
government official for conduct that would violate a criminal or non-
criminal code if committed by a private party.3 For example, we allow 
ambulances to speed in order to reach a hospital in time to save a pa-
tient’s life. That doctrine, however, is generally limited to cases where 
 
 1.  See, e.g., James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010) (discussing the nature of mistakes that arise in the criminal 
justice system). 
 2.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621–22 (2000); The Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883). The Thirteenth Amend-
ment—which forbids slavery and involuntary servitude—is an exception, but is not relevant here. 
 3.  See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.7, at 590–600 (5th ed. 2010) (dis-
cussing defenses available to law enforcement officers). 
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a government official must necessarily act unlawfully to enforce more 
valuable laws or promote more valuable interests. But the law does not 
generally deny private parties any opportunity to assert that defense in 
the same manner that it altogether forecloses a general mistake-of-law 
defense to a criminal charge.4  This article examines whether that dis-
tinction makes sense. 
Part I of this article discusses the principle that mistake or igno-
rance of the law is no excuse. It is settled law that no one can defend 
against a criminal charge on the grounds that he did not intend to flout 
the law and, at worst, made only a reasonable, honest mistake as to 
what he was free to do. Part II examines several areas in which the law 
does precisely the opposite by repeatedly manifesting a willingness to 
forgive reasonable mistakes by one or more actors in the criminal jus-
tice system. Part III then asks whether the developments discussed in 
Part II justify reconsidering the doctrine set forth in Part I that a mis-
take of law should not serve as an excuse to a crime. As I explain there, 
the Supreme Court’s recent and oft-stated rationale for its willingness 
to forgive mistakes made by actors in the criminal justice system mili-
tates strongly in favor of allowing private parties to assert a mistake-
of-law defense. If the law is willing to countenance reasonable mistakes 
that government officials make, it also should be willing to forgive the 
reasonable mistakes that the rest of us make. And if that is true, then it 
is time to re-examine the hoary mistake-of-law doctrine. 
I.  Mistakes that Are Punished: The Mistake-of-Law 
Doctrine in the Substantive Criminal Law 
One of the oldest proverbs in the criminal law is that neither igno-
rance nor a mistake of law is a defense to a crime.5 The Latin phrase is 
 
 4.  Id. § 10.1, at 552–64 (discussing necessity defense). 
 5.  See Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 726–27 (2012). Ignorance of fact stands on a different 
footing. A mistake of fact can be a defense to a charge because it can disprove a necessary mental 
state. Mistakenly taking someone else’s umbrella does not make one a thief. See LAFAVE, supra 
note 3, § 5.6(b), at 300–04. 
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ignorantia juris non excusat,6 which in English means “tough luck.”7 The 
rule has a pedigree that predates early English common law.8 From the 
thirteenth century onward, the common law has rejected an ignorance 
or mistake-of-law defense.9  American law is the same. State10 and fed- 
 
 
 6.  For the various Latin phrases, see Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Crim-
inal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 76 n.1 (1908). 
 7.  See Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 267 (1987). 
 8.  Roman law addressed the subject. It rejected ignorance as a defense to a violation of 
the common customs of the Italian tribes (the jus gentium), but permitted ignorance as a defense 
to “the more compendious and less common-sense jus civile,” as to which “women, males less 
than [twenty-five] years old, soldiers, peasants, and persons of small intelligence” could raise a 
mistake defense if they “had not had the opportunity to consult counsel familiar with the laws.” 
Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 671, 685 
(1976) (footnotes omitted). 
 9.  See 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 481–84 (Robert Campbell ed., 
5th ed. 1885); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 27 (Jo-
seph Chitty ed. 1826); 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 42 
(George Wilson ed. 1680); 3 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
374 (1966); JOHN SALMOND, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 426 (P. J. Fitzgerald ed., 12th ed. 
1966); 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 94–95 
(London, MacMillan & Co. 1883); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL 
PART §§ 52–74 (2d ed. 1961). The rule has been traced back to the thirteenth century. See Keedy, 
supra note 6, at 78. 
 10.  See Schuster v. State, 48 Ala. 199, 202–03 (Ala. 1872); State v. Paup, 13 Ark. 129, 137–
38 (Ark. 1852); People v. O’Brien, 31 P. 45, 47–48 (Cal. 1892); Fraser v. State, 37 S.E. 114, 116 
(Ga. 1900); People v. Cohn, 193 N.E. 150, 153 (Ill. 1934); Winehart v. State, 6 Ind. 30 (Ind. 
1854); State v. O’Neil, 126 N.W. 454, 456 (Iowa 1910); Jellico Coal Min. Co. v. Commonwealth, 
29 S.W. 26, 26–27 (Ky. 1895); State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30, 33 (Me. 1876); Grumbine v. State, 
60 Md. 355, 356 (Md. 1883); Commonwealth v. Everson, 2 N.E. 839, 840 (Mass. 1885); Black v. 
Ward, 27 Mich. 191, 201 (Mich. 1873); State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29, 38 (Minn. 1878); Whit-
ton v. State, 37 Miss. 379, 382 (Miss. 1859); State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528, 529 (Mo. 1881); Pisar 
v. State, 76 N.W. 869, 870 (Neb. 1898); State v. Carver, 39 A. 973, 974 (N.H. 1898); State v. 
Halsted, 39 N.J.L. 402, 412–13 (N.J.L. 1877); Gardner v. People, 62 N.Y. 299, 304 (N.Y. 1875); 
State v. Boyett, 32 N.C. 336, 343 (N.C. 1849); State v. Pyle, 71 N.W.2d 342, 346 (N.D. 1955); 
Ulsamer v. State, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 889 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1893); Needham v. State, 32 P.2d 92, 
93 (Okla. Crim. App. 1934); State v. Foster, 46 A. 833, 835 (R.I. 1900); State v. South Dakota 
Packing & Shipping Co., 180 N.W. 510, 511 (S.D. 1920); McGuire v. State, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 
54, 55–56 (Tenn. 1846); Medrano v. State, 22 S.W. 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893); State v. Woods, 
179 A. 1, 2 (Vt. 1935). Some states now have codified the rule. See, e.g., People v. Mann, 646 P.2d 
352, 356 (Colo. 1982) (discussing state statute). 
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eral courts,11 as well as treatise writers and other respected authori-
ties,12 also have rejected a mistake defense.13 The proposition that ig- 
norance or mistake of the law is no excuse to a crime is as firmly settled 
a legal doctrine as any rule could hope to be.14 
 
 11.  See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998); Cheek v. United States, 498 
U.S. 192, 199 (1991); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119–24 (1974); United States v. 
Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 
228 (1957); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912); Shevlin-Car-
penter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910); Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 
56, 85 (1907); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (“Ignorance of a fact may 
sometimes be taken as evidence of a want of criminal intent, but not ignorance of the law.”); 
Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833) (“It is a common maxim, familiar to all 
minds, that ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally.”); The 
Joseph, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 451 (1814); Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 358 (D.C. Cir. 
1938); Blumenthal v. United States, 88 F.2d 522, 530 (8th Cir. 1937); N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R. Co. 
v. United States, 239 F. 130, 131 (2d Cir. 1917); Fall v. United States, 209 F. 547, 552 (8th Cir. 
1913); Chadwick v. United States, 141 F. 225, 243 (6th Cir. 1905); United States v. Anthony, 24 
F. Cas. 829, 831–32 (C.N.D.N.Y. 1873). For some possible exceptions to this rule, see Barker v. 
United States, 546 F.2d 940, 946–54 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Wilkey, J., concurring) (reliance upon 
official authority); id. at 954–57 (Merhige, J., concurring) (reliance upon an official interpretation 
of the law). 
 12.  See 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW §§ 294–300 
(5th ed.1872); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 27–69 (2d ed. 1960); 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 45–46 (Belknap Press, 2009) (1881); 
COURTNEY STANHOPE KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 68–69 (13th ed. 1929); 
LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 5.6; 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 399 (11th 
ed. 1912); Rollin M. Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35 (1939). 
 13.  Although Great Britain still rejects an ignorance or mistake of law defense, some 
members of the international community disagree with the English common law rule. For exam-
ple, the Statute of the International Criminal Court specifically provides for a mistake of law 
defense. See ANNEMIEKE VAN VERSEVELD, MISTAKE OF LAW: EXCUSING PERPETRATORS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 2–6 (2012). 
 14.  There is a related principle that could be said to create an exception to the mistake-
is-not-a-defense rule. In certain complex regulatory schemes, Congress has required the govern-
ment to prove that a defendant “willfully” violated the law. See, e.g., Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202–03 
(federal tax code); United States v. Liu, No. 10-10613, slip op. 11-16 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 2013) 
(copyright laws); United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 826–29 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(export control laws). The Supreme Court has read the term “willfully” as requiring the govern-
ment to prove an intentional violation of a known legal duty. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 
184, 191 (1998); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 138 (1994); Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200; 
United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 
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Courts and commentators have offered several rationales for re-
jecting a mistake-of-law defense.15 The oldest rationale is that every-
one knows the criminal law because it grows out of and conforms to 
the customs, mores, and morals of the community.16 There were only 
nine common law felonies,17 the argument goes, and they mirrored the 
prevailing moral code.18 Everyone, therefore, knew what was and was 
not a crime. A second justification for the no-mistake rule rests on the 
fear that a mistake-of-law defense would cripple law enforcement. Any 
new hurdle for the prosecution to overcome is generally troublesome, 
the argument goes,19 and the mistake-of-law hurdle is especially prob-
 
(1973). In such a case, a defendant can defend by maintaining that he did not subjectively intend 
to break the law or that he mistakenly believed that he acted lawfully. See, e.g., Cheek, 498 U.S. at 
194–96, 204–07. A defendant who reasonably believed that he acted lawfully could offer that 
evidence to defeat the government’s proof. See Sharon Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An 
Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341 (1998). 
 15.  See Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 738–59; Cass, supra note 8, at 689–95. 
 16.  See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199 (the rule that ignorance of the law is no defense is “[b]ased 
on the notion that the law is definite and knowable”); 1 AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 481 (“Ignorance 
or error with regard to matter of fact, is often inevitable: that is to say, no attention or advertence 
could prevent it. But ignorance or error with regard to the state of the law, is never inevitable. 
For the law is definite and knowable, or might or ought to be so.”); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
9, at 27; SALMOND, supra note 9, at 426; Jerome Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 
IND. L.J. 1, 15–16 (1957); Livingston Hall & Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 
U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 644 (1941) (“[T]he early criminal law appears to have been well integrated 
with the mores of the time, out of which it arose as ‘custom.’”); 
 17.  The common law felonies were treason, murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, sod-
omy, burglary, larceny, and arson. See STUART P. GREEN, 13 WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: 
THEFT LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE 10, 280 n.3 (2012). 
 18.  See Bruce R. Grace, Note, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 
1395 (1986) (“The refusal to allow mistakes of criminal law as a defense is due to a strong com-
mon law presumption that every person knows the criminal law. In the past, this presumption 
may have been true for the simple reason that the common law of crimes closely tracked a rela-
tively homogeneous community’s moral sensibility.”) (footnotes omitted); Hall & Seligman, su-
pra note 16, at 644; LAFAVE, supra note 3, §1.2(f) at 14–15. 
 19.  See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 19, 77 (2d ed. 2008) (“Any increase in the number of conditions required 
to establish criminal liability increases the opportunity for deceiving courts or juries by the pre-
tense that some condition is not satisfied. . . . [I]f we admit such excuses, crime may be committed 
in the hope (surely sometimes realized) that a false plea of mistake, accident, or mental aberration 
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lematic. The government cannot investigate whether a claim is legiti-
mate by asking the one party who knows that answer—the defendant—
because he can fend off any questioning by invoking his Fifth Amend-
ment Self-Incrimination Privilege.20 As the result, a rogue defendant 
(or his crafty lawyer) could use a phony mistake-of-law defense to raise 
a reasonable doubt of guilt and snooker the jury into an acquittal. That 
result over time would discourage people from learning the law.21 A 
mistake-of-law defense, therefore, could be widely, repeatedly, and 
fraudulently used. 
Modern day scholars disagree over the continued desirability of 
the no-mistake rule. Some defend the common law.22 Others believe 
that it should be re-examined and rejected or modified.23 They believe 
 
would succeed.”). 
 20.  See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (“The privilege afforded not 
only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal 
statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed 
to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 
27, 38 (2000). 
 21.  See Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. 404, 411 (1833); Cass, supra note 8, at 689–95; 
Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 755–59. 
 22.  See, e.g., HALL, supra note 12, at 376–414. 
 23.  For parties open to reconsideration of the no-mistake rule, see ANDREW 
ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 233–37 (2d ed. 1995); P.J. FITZGERALD, 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PUNISHMENT 122–23 (1962); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING 
CRIMINAL LAW § 9.3, at 730–36 (1978); JEREMY HORDER, EXCUSING CRIME 276 (2004); Cass, 
supra note 8, at 684–89; Grace, supra note 18; Douglas Husak & Andrew von Hirsch, Culpability 
and Mistake of Law, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 157, 166–69 (Stephen Shute et 
al. eds., 1993); Kadish, supra note 7, at 267–68; Dan M. Kahan, Is Ignorance of Fact an Excuse Only 
for the Virtuous?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2123 (1997–98); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an 
Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1997–98); Gerald Leonard, Rape, Mur-
der, and Formalism: What Happens If We Define Mistake of Law?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 507 (2001); 
D. O’Connor, Comment, Mistake and Ignorance in Criminal Cases, 39 MOD. L. REV. 644, 644–53 
(1976); Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent In-
nocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1995–96); Paul K. Ryu & Helen Silving, 
Error Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 466–71 (1957); Kenneth W. Simons, 
Ignorance and Mistake of Criminal Law, Noncriminal Law, and Fact, 9 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 487 
(2011–12); Michael L. Travers, Note, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1301 (1995). For slightly different but overlapping suggested modifications of the rule, see 
FITZGERALD, supra, at 122–24; Grace, supra note 18, at 1412–16; Kadish, supra note 7, at 267–
68; Paul J. Larkin, Jr., A Mistake of Law Defense as a Remedy for Overcriminalization, 26 A.B.A. J. 
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that, regardless of what was true at common law, it no longer is credi-
ble to claim that everyone knows the law,24 particularly since “[t]he 
tight moral consensus that once supported the criminal law has obvi-
ously disappeared.”25 Those scholars also maintain that it is fundamen-
tally unfair, and in many cases unconstitutional, to stigmatize and pun-
ish (let alone imprison) morally blameless parties for engaging in 
conduct that no reasonable person would have thought a crime.26 A 
few in that group are concerned that the proliferation of criminal stat-
 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 10 (Spring 2013); Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 773–75. 
 24.  See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1881 (2000) 
(“Ordinary people do not have the time or training to learn the contents of criminal codes; in-
deed, even criminal law professors rarely know much about what conduct is and isn’t criminal in 
their jurisdictions.”). Even authors who defend the common law rule admit as much. 1 AUSTIN, 
supra note 9, at 481–82 (The proposition “[t]hat any actual system is so knowable, or that any 
actual system has ever been so knowable,” in his colorful words, “is . . . notoriously and ridicu-
lously false.”); Hall, supra note 16, at 14 (describing the ignorantia juris neminem excusat doctrine 
as “an obvious fiction”); Hall & Seligman, supra note 16, at 646 (finding that the ignorance rule 
may have been justified in the early days of the criminal law in England, but over time that pre-
sumption has become “indefensible as a statement of fact”); Keedy, supra note 6, at 91 (calling 
the presumption “absurd”). 
 25.  FLETCHER, supra note 23, § 9.3, at 731–32. 
 26.  See Cass, supra note 8, at 687; Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 738–72; Herbert L. 
Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 107–10 (1962). Distinguished 
scholars have long criticized strict criminal liability for serious offenses on the ground that it 
“leads to conviction of persons who are, morally speaking, innocent.” A.P. Simester, Is Strict Li-
ability Always Wrong?, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 21, 21 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005). See also 
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 77 (rev. ed., 1969) (“Strict criminal liability has never 
achieved respectability in our law.”); H.L.A. HART, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsi-
bility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 136, 152 (“[S]trict liability is odious.”) (2d ed. 
2008); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 422–
25 (1958); Douglas Husak, Strict Liability, Justice, and Proportionality, in APPRAISING STRICT 
LIABILITY 21 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005), at 91–92; Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 828, 831 n.15 (1999) (collecting citations to numerous books and articles criticiz-
ing strict criminal liability); Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Liability Without Fault: A Disquieting 
Trend, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1067–70 (1983); Paul Roberts, Strict Liability and the Presumption 
of Innocence: An Exposé of Functionalist Assumptions, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 21, 21 (A.P. 
Simester ed., 2005), at 182, 191; Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 
55, 56 (1928). Given that criticism, those scholars would, likely, support a mistake-of-law defense. 
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utes has made the penal code arcane, unwieldy, unknowable, and un-
just, a phenomenon colloquially known as “overcriminalization.”27 
Those critics of the no-mistake rule believe that the criminal law must 
evolve in light of the legislative decision to enforce through the crim-
inal process the increasingly technical and recondite rules promulgated 
by the modern regulatory state.28 As Oxford Professor Jeremy Horder 
has explained: 
Ignorantia juris neminem excusat is a maxim perhaps appropriately re-
garded as exception-less in a system of criminal law composed wholly 
or largely of mala in se. But, a legal system that persists in a belief in 
the absolute character of that maxim in a world of ever more far-
reaching, ever more technical and specialized, and ever more inac-
cessible regulatory criminal laws, is a legal system that has simply 
failed to adapt its moral thinking to modern circumstances.29 
The development of strict liability regulatory or “public welfare 
offenses” early in the twentieth century could have triggered a recon-
sideration of the mistake rule, but did not. Perhaps, that was because 
the limited penalties imposed a century ago for such offenses amelio-
rated the harsh results of penalizing morally blameless parties.30 The 
 
 27.  Numerous scholars and practitioners have described the phenomenon of overcrimi-
nalization of the law and have debated the multifarious problems it causes. DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2009); ONE NATION, UNDER 
ARREST (Paul Rosenzweig & Brian W. Walsh eds., 2010); Andrew Ashworth, Conceptions of Over-
criminalization, 5 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 407 (2008); Darryl K. Brown, Can Criminal Law be 
Controlled?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 971 (2010) (reviewing DOUGLAS HUSAK, 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008)); Stuart P. Green, Is 
There Too Much Criminal Law?, 6 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 737 (2009) (reviewing HUSAK); Paul 
J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715 (2013); 
Edwin Meese III, Overcriminalization in Practice: Trends and Recent Controversies, 8 SETON HALL 
CIR. REV. 505 (2012); Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 541 (2005); George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded Shrimp and Other High Crimes: Ad-
dressing the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417 (2007); 
Larry D. Thompson, The Reality of Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 577 (2011); Dick 
Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform: The Dilemma of 
Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279 (2007). 
 28.  See HORDER, supra note 23, at 276; Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 738–72. 
 29.  HORDER, supra note 23, at 276 (footnote omitted). 
 30.  See Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 741; Sayre, supra note 26, at 58–59, 67, 72, 78–
82. Some courts stated that imprisonment would be inappropriate for public welfare offenses. See 
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prime conditions for a re-examination, however, may lie just over the 
horizon. There has been a proliferation of regulatory laws backed up 
by criminal penalties in the last 40 years. Today, it is not uncommon 
for those crimes to carry a term of imprisonment.31 The result is that 
there are far more opportunities today to witness the criminal law be-
ing used to produce a miscarriage of justice than ever before. 
Moreover, the political climate is fertile for legislative or judicial 
reconsideration of any ancient rule with questionable validity today. 
The overcriminalization phenomenon has attracted a broad-based co-
alition of organizations. Groups from the Right and the Left that oth-
erwise ordinarily do not share the same views on public policy have 
united to oppose overcriminalization of the law.32  All that may need 
to occur is for some event to force public policy decisionmakers to re-
consider the defense or for some powerful or influential party to tee 
up the issue for consideration by public policy decisionmakers.33 That 
event or party could occur or be found in the legislative,34 judicial,35 or 
 
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 617 (1994) (collecting authorities); People ex rel. Price v. 
Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 121 N.E. 474, 477 (N.Y. 1918) (Cardozo, J.). 
 31.  See, e.g., United States v. McNab, 331 F.2d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003) (eight years’ im-
prisonment for importing slightly undersized lobsters in plastic, not paper, in violation of Hon-
duran law). 
 32.  See Zach Dillon, Foreword, Symposium on Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 525, 525 (2013) (“The Heritage Foundation and the American Civil Liberties 
Union joined forces to cosponsor our live Symposium and send the unified message that whether 
you are liberal, moderate, or conservative, overcriminalization is an issue that can no longer be 
ignored.”); BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, Heritage Found. & Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal 
Def. Lawyers, WITHOUT INTENT: HOW CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT 
REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW (2010) (joint report authored by The Heritage Foundation 
and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). 
 33.  For a discussion of how such events occur, see Paul J. Larkin, Jr., John Kingdon’s “Three 
Streams” Theory and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 J.L. & POL. 25 
(2012). 
 34.  Congress has tentatively offered some interest in revising the federal criminal code. 
See generally The Criminal Code Modernization and Simplification Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 1823 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. (2011). The proposed Criminal Code Modernization and Simplification Act of 
2011, however, did not contain a mistake-of-law defense. 
 35.  The Supreme Court has reiterated the common law no-mistake rule on several occa-
sions within the past several decades, see, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998), 
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executive branch, although that last option is the least likely of the 
three.36 
It is likely that the Supreme Court in particular will have to address 
this issue over the next decade. Overcriminalization and the problems 
it causes show no sign of abating.37 In response, defendants will use 
every possible defense to stave off conviction. One such defense is mis-
take of law.38 Defendants will assert that defense in the lower federal 
courts, forcing the judiciary to decide if the common law rule retains 
validity today. Given the competition between the deeply entrenched 
nature of the common law rule and the deeply held belief that the rule 
can cause a miscarriage of justice in a particular case, it is unlikely that 
the federal circuit courts will reach a unanimous position on the con-
tinued wisdom of the no-mistake rule. The upshot is that at some point 
a convicted defendant, or the government, will ask the Supreme Court 
to overturn or reaffirm it. 
When that happens, there is reason to be hopeful that the Supreme 
Court can be persuaded to reconsider the no-mistake rule. Over the 
 
albeit sometimes just in passing, see, e.g., Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 652 
(2009) (calling the rule a “legal cliché”). But the Court has not yet reviewed a case that would 
force the Justices to decide whether to revisit the issue. The closest that the Supreme Court has 
come to re-examining the no-mistake rule is Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991). Cheek 
involved a prosecution for violation of the federal income tax laws, which require the government 
to prove that a party “willfully” misstated his income. Id. at 192. The Court noted that a mistake 
of law generally is no defense, but could be raised in defense in that case. Id. at 199–201. The 
reason was that the willfulness requirement obliged the government to prove that the defendant 
intentionally violated a known legal duty, and a reasonable mistake of law would exonerate a 
defendant. Id. The Court’s willingness to allow a mistake-of-law defense to be asserted in that 
setting, however limited it may be, does suggest that the Court is receptive to rethinking relevant 
substantive criminal law doctrines. 
 36.  The Justice Department is unlikely to endorse a mistake-of-law defense because pros-
ecutors see no benefit in new substantive criminal law defenses, however sound one may be. See, 
e.g., Cass, supra note 8, at 689; Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 749. For a discussion of the 
accomplice-like relationship between legislators and prosecutors, see Larkin, supra note 27; Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001). 
 37.  Congress continues to churn out new federal criminal laws. See, e.g., WALSH & 
JOSLYN, supra note 32. 
 38.  See Larkin, supra note 27, at 720–21 (discussing acknowledgement of the issue by the 
academy, Congress, the American Bar Association, and others); Meese & Larkin, supra note 5 
(endorsing a mistake-of-law defense). 
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last few decades, the Court has created three different doctrines that 
rest on the proposition that not every mistake demands a remedy. In 
each case the Court has concluded that the criminal justice system is 
better served through forgiveness than punishment when an actor in 
the criminal process stumbles. The rationale that the Court has given, 
ironically, also applies when the question is not whether a police of-
ficer, prosecutor, or judge should be punished for a mistake, but 
whether a private party should receive the same treatment. As it turns 
out, the principle that the law should be blind as between the parties 
may demand that the Court re-examine and either ditch or revise the 
common law no-mistake rule. 
II.  Mistakes that Are Forgiven: The Reasonable-
Mistake, Qualified-Immunity, and Harmless-Error 
Doctrines 
Three doctrines stand in stark contrast to the common-law mis-
take doctrine: the reasonable-mistake exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule, the qualified-immunity doctrine, and the 
harmless-error doctrine. The Supreme Court has created each doc-
trine in the last forty years in response to the criticism that it makes 
little sense to punish an actor in the criminal justice system for making 
a reasonable mistake in the exercise of his responsibilities. Each doc-
trine softens the rigors of the principle that a remedy is necessary to 
ensure that a rule is not just a collection of words. 
A.  The Reasonable-Mistake Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 
At common law, all relevant evidence was admissible regardless of 
its provenance.39 How a party acquired evidence was immaterial, even 
 
 39.  For a concise discussion of English common-law criminal procedure, see THEODORE 
F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 424–41 (5th ed. 1956); John 
H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1978). Professors 
McCormick and Wigmore have the classic treatises on the common law of evidence. See 
CHARLES KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (4th ed., John William 
Strong ed., 1992); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (3d ed. 1940). 
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if it was obtained unlawfully.40 The Supreme Court endorsed that 
proposition early in the twentieth century.41 
In 1914, the Supreme Court created an exception to the common-
law rule for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In Weeks v. United 
States,42 the Court held that evidence the police obtained due to an 
unlawful search or seizure is inadmissible at trial. Despite the fact that 
neither the text of the amendment, nor the historical events that lead 
to its adoption, involved suppression of evidence,43 the Court con-
 
 40.  See, e.g., People v. Adams, 68 N.E. 636, 638 (N.Y. 1903), aff’d Adams v. New York, 
192 U.S. 585 (1904); cf. Kerr v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (rejecting the defendant’s claim 
that criminal charges against him should be dismissed because he was unlawfully brought into 
the United States). 
 41.  In Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594–95 (1904), the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the common law rule and also refused to construe the Fourth Amendment to require ex-
clusion of evidence seized due to an unlawful search or seizure. 
 42.  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). 
 43.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 21 (1997) (“Tort law remedies were . . . clearly the ones presupposed by the Framers 
of the Fourth Amendment and counterpart state constitutional provisions. Supporters of the ex-
clusionary rule cannot point to a single major statement from the Founding—or even the ante-
bellum or Reconstruction eras—supporting Fourth Amendment exclusion of evidence in a crim-
inal trial.”); William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional 
Remedy, 88 GEO L.J. 799, 835–36 (2000) (footnotes omitted) (“As is well known, at the time of 
the Fourth Amendment’s adoption, courts offered money damages, but not exclusion, for viola-
tions of the rules of search and seizure. Neither the framers nor the common-law judges who 
rendered opinions concerning search and seizure ever intimated that courts should consider ex-
clusion as a remedy for violations of these rules. Moreover, American judges of the early republic 
consistently rejected arguments for exclusion. Given these points, a critic of exclusion might con-
tend that the only remedy for someone in Weeks’s position is money damages for the harm he 
has suffered. Exclusion, the critic could maintain, can never be constitutionally justified because 
the framers did not make allowance for it.”). For a discussion of the historical background to the 
Fourth Amendment, see JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME 
COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 30–48 (1966); NELSON B. LASSON, 
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 51–105 (1970); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Ori-
gins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1365, 1369–72 (1983); TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (1969). 
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cluded that suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence was a neces-
sary remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation.44 Admitting the evi-
dence would make the courts complicit in the violation by giving judi-
cial “sanction” to the officers’ illegality.45 Weeks thereby created what 
has been known ever since as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule.46 
 
 
 
 
 44.  In Weeks, the Court adverted to the combination of the Fourth Amendment and Fifth 
Amendment Self-Incrimination Privilege as a rationale for excluding unlawfully seized evidence. 
See 232 U.S. at 383–84. Over time, however, the Court eschewed reliance on the Self-Incrimi-
nation Privilege as a justification for the exclusionary rule. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 
463 (1976). Later cases have made clear that the sole justification for the rule today is its potential 
deterrent effect. See infra notes 48–49. 
 45. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392; see also, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) 
(noting “the imperative of judicial integrity” as a rationale for the rule); James Boyd White, For-
gotten Points in the “Exclusionary Rule” Debate, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1279 (1983) (The Weeks 
rule “was simply an automatic consequence of the . . . view that one’s property was immune from 
seizure; in such cases exclusion is built into the fourth amendment itself.”); cf. Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[F]or my part I think that it a less evil 
that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.”). In 
1949 the Supreme Court incorporated the Fourth Amendment against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33, but did not 
extend the exclusionary rule to the states for another 12 years, ruling in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643, 656–57 (1961), that unlawfully obtained evidence also may not be used in the prosecution’s 
case-in-chief in state criminal cases. 
 46.  The United States stands alone in this regard. No other country automatically ex-
cludes evidence obtained by virtue of an unlawful police search or seizure. See Sanchez-Llamas v. 
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 344 (2006); Craig Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
375, 399–400 (2001). The Court has created other exclusionary rules for violations of different 
Bill of Rights provisions. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (holding that out-of-court 
eyewitness identifications are subject to review to determine if they are sufficiently unreliable that 
due process forbids their use); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding a party subjected 
to a custodial interrogation must be properly advised of his rights and waive them before his 
statements can be admitted during the government’s case-in-chief); Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201 (1964) (holding evidence obtained from questioning a defendant in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment Counsel Clause must be suppressed). The Court has not yet had occasion to decide 
whether a reasonable mistake exception would apply to those rules, but insofar as they are justi-
fied on deterrence grounds, it is likely that the Court would apply the same exception. 
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Since Weeks, the Supreme Court has revisited and revised the rule 
on numerous occasions.47 The Court has abandoned the judicial integ-
rity underpinning for the rule in favor of a deterrence justification,48 
which has become the “sole purpose” for the rule.49 The Court also 
has made clear that the Fourth Amendment itself does not require sup-
pression of evidence and that exclusion is not even required in every 
case where there is an unlawful search or seizure.50 The Court has lim-
ited application of the rule to the prosecution’s case-in-chief at trial, 
allowing unlawfully obtained evidence to be used in a variety of other 
settings, such as before the grand jury, to impeach a defendant who 
testifies at trial, or in civil proceedings.51 
Probably few rules of criminal procedure have caused the police 
and prosecutors as much consternation as the exclusionary rule or have 
given commentators as much opportunity to debate a Supreme Court 
doctrine.52 Some of the rule’s critics have urged the Supreme Court to 
 
 47.  The Supreme Court’s development of Fourth Amendment case law is discussed at 
length in Professor LaFave’s multi-volume treatise. See 1–6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (4th ed. 2004). 
 48.  See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011); Herring v. United States, 
555 U.S. 135, 141 & n.2 (2009); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905–08 (1984). 
 49.  See, e.g., Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426. 
 50.  See, e.g., Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426; Leon, 468 U.S. at 909, 921 & n.22. 
 51.  See Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (holding the 
exclusionary rule inapplicable to parole revocation hearings); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 
1032 (1984) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to civil deportation proceedings); Havens 
v. United States, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not forbid use of 
illegally seized evidence to impeach a testifying defendant); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) 
(holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in federal habeas corpus review of state criminal 
convictions); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that the exclusionary rule is 
inapplicable in federal civil tax enforcement proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338 (1974) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not prohibit use before the grand jury of 
illegally-obtained evidence). 
 52.  Commentary on the rule is voluminous. See A.B.A. STATEMENT CONCERNING THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE (June 1981); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives 
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the 
Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964); Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965); Yale Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an “Unnatural” or 
“Illogical” Extension Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978); John 
Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1973–74); Dallin H. Oaks, 
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abandon the rule altogether on the ground first articulated by then-
Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo that it is irrational for “a crim-
inal . . . to go free because the constable has blundered.”53 Others have 
urged the Court to limit its application to only the most egregious 
cases. They urged the Court to adopt what has been variously called a 
“good faith” or “reasonable mistake” exception to the exclusionary 
rule.54 
Critics in the latter category have won the debate. In 1984, the 
Supreme Court adopted a reasonable-mistake (or objective “good 
faith”) exception in United States v. Leon.55 In Leon, the Court reasoned 
that courts should not suppress unlawfully obtained evidence if a police 
officer reasonably believed that his actions were lawful.56 The test is 
not a matter of subjective good faith; the inquiry is objective: Could a 
reasonable police officer have believed that his actions were lawful? If 
so, Leon concluded, the cost of excluding relevant evidence is too great 
to justify any hoped-for deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.57 
 
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1969–70); Monrad 
G. Paulsen, Law and Police Practice: Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 NW. U.L. REV. 
65 (1957); Malcolm Richard Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 
JUDICATURE 215 (1978); Charles Allen Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blun-
ders?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 736 (1972). 
 53.  People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926); see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 39, 
§ 2184 (“Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks it, but to 
let off somebody else who broke something else.”). 
 54.  See, e.g., Edna F. Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The “Reasonable” Exception 
to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978). 
 55.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 56.  Id. at 926. 
 57.  See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 
348–49 (1987). 
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While the reasonable-mistake exception is controversial,58 the Su-
preme Court has reaffirmed Leon on several occasions since 1984.59 
The result is that the reasonable-mistake exception, like the underly-
ing exclusionary rule, has now become settled law. 
The reasonable-mistake exception also is very prosecution-
friendly.60 For example, negligence, and perhaps even intentional mis-
conduct, by non-law enforcement personnel never should lead to sup-
pression. That is the lesson of Arizona v. Evans.61 Invoking the reason-
able-mistake exception, the Court refused to suppress evidence seized 
by officers in reliance on an arrest warrant that had been recalled and 
should have been culled from the court’s computer system, but re-
mained on file due to negligence by the court’s staff.62 The purpose of 
the rule was to deter the police from violating the Fourth Amendment, 
 
 58.  Some commentators criticized the good faith exception that Justice White first pro-
posed in his opinion in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246–67 (1983) (White, J., concurring), and 
that the full Court (per Justice White) endorsed in Leon. Their argument was that the exception 
would undo the benefits of the rule. See Yale Kamisar, “Comparative Reprehensibility” and the 
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1987); William J. Mertens & Silas J. 
Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derail-
ing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981). 
 59.  See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule when 
police reasonably relied on a subsequently invalidated statute that permitted a warrantless search); 
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule where the evidence 
was acquired by reliance on a warrant that court employees mistakenly failed to cull from a com-
puter file); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule 
where the evidence was acquired by reliance on a warrant that police employees mistakenly failed 
to cull from a computer file); Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (refusing to 
apply the exclusionary rule when the police rely on subsequently overruled judicial precedent 
allowing a warrantless search); cf. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (relying on the costs 
of suppression noted in Leon in ruling that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to viola-
tions of the Fourth Amendment “knock and announce” requirement adopted in Wilson v. Arkan-
sas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)). 
 60.  Commentators now treat the reasonable mistake exception as a given. The current 
debate is whether the Court’s post-Leon extension of the exception has gutted the underlying 
rule. See Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 463 (2009); Craig M. Bradley, Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2012); Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme 
Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009). 
 61.  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
 62.  Id. at 4–5, 14–16. 
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the Court explained, so it made no sense to apply the rule to the actions 
of non-law enforcement personnel.63 
Even when the police are at fault, the reasonable-mistake excep-
tion has an impressive reach. Isolated instances of negligence, “atten-
uated from” a search or seizure, are insufficient to justify suppression.64 
Only where the police conduct is “deliberate, reckless, or grossly neg-
ligent,” or is due to “recurring or systematic negligence,” should un-
lawfully obtained evidence be excluded.65 The two critical considera-
tions when deciding whether evidence must be suppressed are the 
flagrancy of police misconduct and the possibility of correcting law en-
forcement behavior through alternatives to suppression. From what 
the Court has said about those factors, it appears that the reasonable-
mistake exception would allow the admission of unlawfully obtained 
evidence in all but the most egregious cases of willful police miscon-
duct.66 The reasonable-mistake exception, therefore, should forgive a 
 
 63.  Id. at 16 (“Application of the Leon framework supports a categorical exception to the 
exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees.”); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 
348 (1987) (stating that the exclusionary is designed to deter police misconduct and refusing to 
apply it to an officer’s reliance on a statute later held unconstitutional); Massachusetts v. Shep-
pard, 468 U.S. 981, 990–91 (1984) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule when a magistrate 
failed to attach the search warrant affidavit to the warrant itself); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 916 (1984) (stating that the exclusionary rule exists “to deter police misconduct rather than 
to punish the errors of judges and magistrates”). 
 64.  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009). 
 65.  Id. at 144. 
 66.  Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate 
enough to yield “meaningfu[l]” deterrence, and culpable enough to be “worth the price paid by 
the justice system.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009); accord Davis v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011). Whether the exclusionary rule is justified “varies with the 
culpability of the law enforcement conduct,” so making “‘an assessment of the flagrancy of the 
police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus’” of deciding whether to suppress 
evidence. Herring, 555 U.S. at 143 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984)). 
Because “the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, 
or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence,” in order “[t]o trigger the exclusion-
ary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, 
and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Id. at 
144. On the one hand, “[w]hen the police exhibit ‘deliberate’, ‘reckless’, or ‘grossly negligent’ 
disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to 
outweigh the resulting costs.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144). On 
the other hand, “when the police act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their 
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police officer’s missteps in the vast majority of cases. The result is that 
suppression now should occur, not in every case where there is a 
Fourth Amendment violation, as Weeks contemplated, but only in cases 
where an officer willfully flouted the Fourth Amendment or engaged 
in a sustained, unrelenting pattern of reckless or negligent conduct. 
B.  The Qualified-Immunity Doctrine 
A close sibling to the reasonable-mistake exception is the qualified-
immunity doctrine.67 That doctrine followed on the heels of the Su-
preme Court’s decision to recognize a cause of action for damages for 
the federal government’s violation of a party’s constitutional rights. 
The leading case is Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents.68 
Bivens sued several federal law enforcement officers for conducting an 
illegal warrantless search of his home and for using unreasonable force 
in the process. The Supreme Court ruled that, in the absence of an 
 
conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence 
rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.” Id. at 2427–28 (citations and 
internal punctuation omitted). Two additional factors also lessen the need for the exclusionary 
rule to play a deterrent role. One is the availability of a civil damages action under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against federal law enforcement officers or 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) against state or local officers. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 
586, 596–98 (2006). The other is “the increasing professionalism of police forces, including a new 
emphasis on internal police discipline,” as well as “the increasing use of various forms of citizen 
review.” Id. at 598, 599. 
 67.  In Leon, the Supreme Court relied on the qualified-immunity doctrine to define the 
reach of the reasonable mistake exception. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 
(1984) (relying on the inquiry set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 (1987), to 
define the contours of the reasonable mistake exception); cf. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 
596–99 (2006) (discussing whether the availability of a damages remedy for Fourth Amendment 
violations eliminates a need for the exclusionary rule). Since then the Court has cited decisions 
involving the qualified-immunity doctrine in reasonable mistake cases, as well as the opposite. 
See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244–45 (2012); id. at 1245 n.1 (“Although Leon 
involved the proper application of the exclusionary rule to remedy a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion, we have held that ‘the same standard of objective reasonableness that we applied in the 
context of a suppression hearing in Leon defines the qualified-immunity accorded an officer’ who 
obtained or relied on an allegedly invalid warrant.”) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 
344 (1986)). Leon and Messerschmidt show that the two doctrines have a common core and periph-
ery. 
 68.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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exclusive or equally valuable congressional remedy, federal courts may 
award a private party money damages against federal officials for a vi-
olation of that party’s constitutional rights.69 “[D]amages have been 
regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests 
in liberty.”70 Moreover, private parties ordinarily could not obtain in-
junctive relief because they could not prove that the government’s il-
legality is likely to recur.71 As a result, for people not charged with a 
crime, money damages are not just the ordinary remedy, but also the 
only available remedy. As Justice Harlan pithily explained, “[f]or peo-
ple in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”72 
Bivens gave private parties the opportunity to bring a tort action 
for constitutional violations directly against federal officials without 
being shut out by the bar of sovereign immunity.73 But Bivens left open 
the possibility that government officials could defend against liability 
 
 
 69.  Id. at 390–97. 
 70.  Id. at 395. 
 71.  See id. at 395–97. 
 72.  Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). Since Bivens, the Supreme Court 
recognized similar claims under the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
and equal protection principles contained within the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). Since then, how-
ever, the Court has declined to create similar tort actions in connections with other claims. See 
Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012) (declining to create a Bivens action against private in-
dividuals working at a private prison); Hui v. Castenada, 130 U.S. 1845 (2010) (holding that the 
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(a) (2012), precluded a Bivens action against federal 
public health officials); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007) (declining to recognize a Bivens 
action for retaliating against the exercise of property rights); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 
403 (2002) (declining to create a Bivens action against government officials for allegedly hindering 
the plaintiff’s ability to bring a tort claim); Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 
(2001) (declining to create a Bivens action against the corporation running a private prison); 
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (declining to create a Bivens action for the wrongful 
denial of social security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 699 (1987) (declining to 
create a Bivens action for injuries suffered by military personnel in service); Bush v. Lucas, 462 
U.S. 367 (1983) (declining to recognize a Bivens action for federal employees alleging a violation 
of their First Amendment rights by supervisors). 
 73.  Plaintiffs injured by state or local officials can sue under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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on the ground that they were immune from suit.74 The Court resolved 
that issue in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.75 
Harlow held that government officials are entitled to “qualified im-
munity” from liability and trial “insofar as their conduct does not vio-
late clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known.”76 Whether an official may be held 
personally liable for an unlawful official action “generally turns on the 
‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the action, assessed in light of the 
legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.”77 By 
adopting the qualified-immunity doctrine, Harlow sought to accom-
modate two competing interests: the need to ensure that parties in-
jured by unconstitutional government action can recover damages for 
their injuries78 and the need to allow government officials to discharge 
their responsibilities faithfully, and sometimes aggressively, without 
fear of incurring personal monetary liability or suffering harassing lit-
igation.79 Harlow sought to balance those competing interests by 
 
 74.  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395. 
 75.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 76.  Id. at 818. All government officials can invoke qualified immunity, and certain, nar-
rowly defined classes of government officials can also claim absolute immunity from suit when 
acting in an official capacity. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012) (grand jury witnesses); 
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330–34 (1983) (trial witnesses); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
(1982) (the President); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (pre-Harlow decision recogniz-
ing immunity for judges acting in a judicial capacity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) 
(pre-Harlow decision recognizing immunity for prosecutors in their role as advocates); Tenney 
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (pre-Harlow decision recognizing immunity for government 
officials performing a legislative function). 
 77.  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 
 78.  The qualified-immunity analysis is the same for claims brought under Bivens or under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (collecting cases). 
 79.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813–14; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); 
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987). 
Judge Learned Hand described those costs in an oft-cited passage: 
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his pow-
ers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected 
with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, 
if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be 
monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to 
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shielding government officials from liability and trial as long as a rea-
sonable person would have thought that they acted lawfully.  A gov-
ernment official is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court explained, 
unless it was “clearly established” at the time he acted that the Consti-
tution prohibited the actions he took.80 
Harlow involved very high-level government officials: White 
House advisors to the President. Pre-Harlow case law had concluded 
that lower-level government employees also could invoke immunity,81 
but Harlow technically left open the question of whether front-line 
government personnel—in particular, law enforcement officers, the 
type of parties whose conduct gave rise to the Bivens case itself—were 
also entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. The Supreme 
Court answered that question six years later in Anderson v. Creighton.82 
There, a homeowner sued an FBI agent under Bivens for damages 
for making an allegedly unlawful warrantless search of his home, in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the 
Harlow qualified-immunity doctrine is just as applicable to inferior 
government officials as it is to the President’s closest lieutenants. Since 
 
know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to sub-
mit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the 
inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, 
or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again 
the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in 
the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his 
good faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been 
truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been 
honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. As is so often 
the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either 
alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed 
the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty 
to the constant dread of retaliation. Judged as res nova, we should not hesitate to follow 
the path laid down in the books. 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). 
 80.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 81.  See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 245–48 (1974). 
 82.  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). In Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), 
the Court implied that law enforcement officers could invoke qualified immunity under Harlow, 
but that was not the holding of the case. 
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then, the Court has applied the qualified-immunity doctrine in numer-
ous other contexts,83 including cases involving law enforcement offi-
cials.84 
As the Court has explained in those later cases, the Harlow quali-
fied-immunity standard is a difficult hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome. 
Courts may not analyze the challenged action at “a high level of gen-
erality.”85 Otherwise, plaintiffs would convert qualified immunity into 
“a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of 
extremely abstract rights.”86 The question is not, for example, whether 
warrantless searches generally are permissible, but is whether this par-
ticular warrantless search is lawful.87 Moreover, the “clearly estab-
lished” requirement also is a very strict one. A government official 
“could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal de-
velopments, nor could he fairly be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade 
conduct not previously identified as unlawful.”88 Overcoming a quali-
fied-immunity defense “do[es] not require” a plaintiff to identify “a 
 
 83.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (when resolving a qualified-immunity 
claim, a court may first decide whether the plaintiff has stated a valid claim before addressing 
qualified immunity); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) (declining to require a plaintiff 
to adduce evidence of an improper motive in order to defeat a qualified-immunity claim); Behrens 
v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996) (holding that district court orders denying qualified-immunity 
claims are immediately appealable even if other claims remain for trial); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 
U.S. 511 (1985) (holding that district court orders denying qualified-immunity claims are imme-
diately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) under the collateral order doctrine). 
 84.  See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. 
Ct. 2074 (2011); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004); 
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); Wilson v. Layne, 526 
U.S. 603 (1999); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1986); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 
(1994); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). 
 85.  al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084. 
 86.  Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639; see also al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084; Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 
U.S. 194, 198–99 (2004); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999); cf. United States v. Lanier, 
520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (same standard to be used when deciding whether a state official can be 
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) for a violation of a party’s constitutional rights). 
 87.  See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639–40. 
 88.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 590 
(1998); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
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case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the stat-
utory or constitutional question beyond debate.”89 The nature of the 
error also is immaterial. Qualified immunity applies whether a govern-
ment official makes a mistake of fact, a mistake of law, or a mistake of 
both.90 The result is that qualified immunity affords government offi-
cials “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and 
protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly vio-
late the law.”91 
C.  The Harmless-Error Doctrine 
The last example of forgiveness is the harmless-error doctrine. Po-
lice officers are not the only ones who make mistakes; prosecutors and 
judges do, too, more often today than at common law.92 
Trials at early common law were fairly straightforward affairs. The 
 
 89.  al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 90.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The protection of qualified im-
munity applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is “‘a mistake of law, a mis-
take of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’”) (citing Groh v. Ramirez, 
540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 
(1978); internal punctuation omitted). 
 91.  Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011), and Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)) (internal 
punctuation omitted from Messerschmidt). 
 92.  Most mistakes made by prosecutors and judges occur at trial, but some happen be-
forehand. A classic example occurs when a prosecutor fails to disclose exculpatory material to the 
defense in a timely manner. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–88 (1963), the Supreme Court 
held that the Due Process Clause requires the government to disclose exculpatory evidence to a 
defendant before entry of a final judgment. Applying Brady, the Court in Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972), ruled that the government also must disclose evidence impeaching 
a government witness. Some prosecutors still have not gotten the message. See Smith v. Cain, 
132 S. Ct. 627, 630–31 (2012); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451, 475 (2009); Banks v. Dretke, 540 
U.S. 668, 675, 705–06 (2004). Brady does not require the government to disclose exculpatory 
material before trial, but Congress has imposed such a requirement by rule. See FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 16. The prosecutor or court also could make a scheduling error and unduly delay the start of 
trial. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant “the right to a . . . speedy trial.” See, e.g., 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (establishing factors for courts to use when evaluating a 
Speedy Trial Clause claim); Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009) (applying Barker factors). 
In order to give the parties concrete guidance on when trials should commence, Congress also 
has regulated the subject in the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2012). 
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crimes, such as robbery and murder, were, by contemporary standards, 
legally uncomplicated. There were no racketeering offenses93 or con-
tinuing criminal enterprises94; even the crime of conspiracy lay in the 
future.95 The story is different today. The substantive criminal law has 
greatly expanded beyond its humble origins. The criminal law reaches 
not only the simple acts forbidden at common law, but also a wide 
range of complex conduct made criminal by legislatures that have used 
the criminal law to police the modern regulatory state.96 
 
 
 
 93.  The paradigm racketeering law is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act of 1970, which Congress enacted as § 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). See 18 U.S.C. § 1961–68 (2012); United States v. 
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). 
 94.  In order to deal with organizations engaged in large-scale narcotics trafficking, in 
1970 Congress enacted the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute as § 408 of Title II of the 
Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1265 (1970). See 21 
U.S.C. § 848 (2012); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977). 
 95.  See LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 12.1(a), at 649–50. 
 96.  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
282–83 (1993); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing 
Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law 
in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 37 (1997); Meese & Larkin, 
supra note 5, at 735–36, 744–46. Potential defendants now include not only the parties who ac-
tually commit an offense, known as “principals,” but also an increasingly broad range of confed-
erates, sometimes including parties who are held responsible simply because they occupy a supe-
rior position in an organization, such as a corporation. See John Hasnas, The Centenary of a 
Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009); 
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 
(1996); Note, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 1243 (1979). Common law crimes required proof of an evil intent to establish 
guilt. At common law a crime consisted of “a vicious will” and “an unlawful act consequent upon 
such vicious will.” 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9 at 20; see also Morissette v. United States, 342 
U.S. 246, 251 (1952); Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 317 (2009) (the Latin phrase was the phrase “Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit 
rea.”). By contrast, contemporary legislatures have modified or abandoned that requirement for 
a large number of offenses, sometimes leaving parties strictly liable for their own actions or those 
of a colleague in a legitimate business enterprise. See, e.g., Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 733–
36. 
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The trial process at common law also was uncomplicated.97 Jurors 
were not disinterested fact-finders. They were members of the com-
munity who knew the facts of the case. Courts devised simple proce-
dures, and there were no rules of evidence. Evidentiary principles came 
into being only after lawyers became commonplace, which did not oc-
cur in felony cases for several hundred years.98 Trial procedure today 
is far more complex and is subject to still-developing rules of federal 
constitutional law.99  At any stage during trial—particularly a jury 
trial—one party or the other, as well as the judge, can stumble. The 
likelihood of that happening increases as appellate courts refine old 
rules or establish new ones for trial courts.100 
At common law even if prosecutors and judges made mistakes be-
fore or at trial, convicted defendants had few opportunities for post-
trial, appellate, or habeas corpus relief from a conviction,101 so most 
 
 97.  For a concise discussion of English common law criminal procedure, see THEODORE 
F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 424–41 (5th ed. 1956). For in-
depth treatments of the process, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY 
CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE 
AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIENT RÉGIME (1976); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF 
REASONABLE DOUBT (2008). For an in-depth description of contemporary English criminal 
procedure, see ANDREW ASHWORTH & MIKE REDMAYNE, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (4th ed. 
2010). For a concise discussion of pre-20th century American criminal procedure, see 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 20–27, 235–58, 383–418. 
 98.  The common law rules governing representation by counsel were counterintuitive. A 
defendant charged with a misdemeanor was entitled to be represented by counsel, but, ironically, 
a felony defendant was not, even though felonies generally were capital crimes. See Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932); FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 27. Today, a defendant can be 
convicted, but not imprisoned, without first being afforded the right to obtain counsel or to have 
one appointed if he is indigent. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
 99.  See, e.g., Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 730–33. 
 100.  For example, for nearly 200 years the Supreme Court had little occasion to define the 
scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. In the last thirty years, however, the Court 
has made up for lost time. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (ruling that the preliminary 
hearing testimony of a witness unavailable at trial can be admitted if the evidence bears adequate 
indicia of reliability). In fact, the Court still is developing the law governing confrontation re-
quirements. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (introduction of DNA lab results 
by an expert who did not perform the analysis does not violate the Confrontation Clause). 
 101.  A defendant had scant opportunity to win a new trial at common law in England and 
early in the history in the United States. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408–10 (1993); 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 255–58. The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not establish a right to appeal 
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errors likely went uncorrected.102 But this has changed as legislatures 
established appellate systems for criminal cases,103 and the Supreme 
Court expanded the scope of federal habeas corpus review.104 By the 
twentieth century, it became common for defendants to claim that they 
were entitled to a new trial (or to be set free) because of an error that 
occurred before or at trial.105 
At first, the courts were reluctant to forgive a trial error and would 
routinely award a defendant a new trial, sometimes for errors that 
would seem entirely trivial today.106 But legislators and judges later re-
alized that some trial process errors would have had no effect on the 
 
a conviction in a federal criminal case. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. Congress did not 
create a right to appeal in capital cases until 1869. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, 
656. Congress did not extend that right to all convicted defendants until 1891 with The Circuit 
Courts of Appeals Act, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827 (1891). Shortly thereafter, the Supreme 
Court held that defendants have no constitutional right to an appeal, McKane v. Durston, 153 
U.S. 684, 688 (1894), thereby making clear that legislatures are to create appellate rights. As for 
post-conviction avenues, The Judiciary Act of 1789 extended the right to petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus to parties held in federal custody, but Congress did not grant parties in state cus-
tody that opportunity until the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385. Today, the 
governing federal habeas corpus statute is the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). Finally, the Constitution vests the federal clemency power in the President, U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 1, but it does not require the states to have a clemency process, Herrera, 506 U.S. 
at 414. 
 102.  The king could grant a convicted defendant clemency. See NAOMI D. HURNAND, 
THE KING’S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE A.D. 1307 (1970); see also Matthew 27:15–23 
(Pontius Pilate released Barabbas as an exercise in clemency during Passover). The President can 
do so today. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (Pardon Clause); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 
150 (1833); JEFFREY P. CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER (2009); WILLARD H. 
HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT (1941); KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, 
PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989). 
 103.  Congress gave every convicted defendant a right to an appeal in 1891 in The Circuit 
Courts of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827 (1891). 
 104.  See Larkin, supra note 33, at 34–35. 
 105.  The number of claims that a defendant could raise also skyrocketed in the last century. 
See Larkin, supra note 33, at 34; Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 731–33. 
 106.  See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946) (“[C]ourts of review ‘tower 
above the trials of criminal cases as impregnable citadels of technicality.’ So great was the threat 
of reversal, in many jurisdictions, that criminal trial became a game for sowing reversible error 
in the record, only to have repeated the same matching of wits when a new trial had been thus 
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outcome of the case because the error was trivial and the proof of the 
defendant’s guilt was overwhelming.107 In this setting, awarding a de-
fendant a new trial became a needless luxury. And so, these new atti-
tudes resulted in the birth of the new legal doctrine, harmless error. 
At first, the Supreme Court applied this doctrine only to non-con-
stitutional errors. But it was not long before the Court extended the 
doctrine to mistakes that violated the Constitution.108 The result has 
been a sizeable expansion in the breadth of that doctrine. Although the 
Supreme Court has identified a few errors that cannot be found harm-
less regardless of the evidence in the record,109 the Court has largely 
 
obtained.”) (footnote omitted); Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEX. L. 
REV. 126 (1927); ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 14, 41–43, 81 (1970). 
 107.  The Supreme Court articulated the following standard that an appellate court should 
use to determine if an error is harmless: 
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the 
jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except 
perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command of 
Congress. . . . But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that hap-
pened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was 
not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights 
were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support 
the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the 
error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the convic-
tion cannot stand. 
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764–65 (citation and footnote omitted). 
 108.  The seminal case is Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The prosecutor in 
closing argument informed the jury that the defendant had not testified at trial, a practice that 
was permissible under state law prior to Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), where the 
Supreme Court held that such a comment improperly burdens the defendant’s Fifth Amendment 
Self-Incrimination Clause privilege to remain silent at trial. The Court in Chapman held that a 
constitutional error can be found harmless if a reviewing court could find that it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 386 U.S. at 24. The Chapman standard for constitutional errors is 
stricter than the Kotteakos standard used for nonconstitutional errors. See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 
112, 116 (2007) (describing the Kotteakos standard as “more forgiving” than the Chapman stand-
ard); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993). 
 109.  See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279–82 (1993) (a constitutionally deficient 
jury instruction on the “reasonable doubt” standard of proof); id. at 279 (identifying as non-
harmless errors total deprivation of representation by defense counsel at trial and trial before a 
biased judge, citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 
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been willing to allow appellate courts to apply the harmless-error doc-
trine widely. The current rule is that most errors that occur before or 
at trial can be found harmless in a given case.110 
 
(1927)); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989) (district court’s unauthorized delega-
tion of jury selection to a magistrate); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (right to self-
representation at trial); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (racial discrimination in the se-
lection of grand jurors); cf. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (suggesting that the 
denial of the right to a public trial cannot be harmless). Those errors—mistakes that the Court 
has termed “structural,” Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218 (2006)—defy harmless-
error analysis for one of three reasons: (1) they are so egregious as render a trial a nullity; (2) they 
so alter the trial record that appellate review of their effect is impossible; or (3) they would be 
harmless as a matter of law in every case, making appellate review vacuous. See United States v. 
Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2010); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306–12 (1991). 
There is a fourth category of errors where harmless-error analysis is unavailable: claims that re-
quire a defendant to establish prejudice in order to make out a violation. See, e.g., Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 110.  See Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2164–66 (2010) (jury instruction that allowed defendant to 
be convicted for conduct predating enactment of the relevant statute, in violation of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause); Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148 (2009) (denial of defense right to exercise a per-
emptory challenge to a potential juror); Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (one invalid 
alternative theory of guilt is unconstitutional); Fry, 551 U.S. at 116 (exclusion of potentially ex-
culpatory defense evidence); Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (failure to submit a sentencing factor to the 
jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment Jury Trial Clause); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 
16–19 (2003) (trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the meaning of a “principal” offender 
under state law); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (trial judge found that a false state-
ment was “material,” instead of submitting the issue to the jury); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 
5–6 (1996) (omission of an essential element of an offense); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 627–31 (improper 
use for impeachment purposes of defendant’s silence after being given the warnings required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306–12 (erroneous admission 
of a confession coerced from the defendant); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752–54 (1990) 
(unconstitutionally overbroad jury instructions at the sentencing stage of a capital case); Carella 
v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989) (jury instruction containing an erroneous conclusive pre-
sumption); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (admission of evidence at the sentencing 
stage of a capital case in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Pope v. Illinois, 481 
U.S. 497, 501–04 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of the offense); Rose v. Clark, 
478 U.S. 570 (1986) (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption); Crane v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986) (erroneous exclusion of defendant’s testimony regarding the 
circumstances of his confession); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (erroneous re-
strictions on defense cross-examination, in violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986) (violation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d), which 
restricts who may be present before the grand jury); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) (right 
to be present at trial); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 503–04 (1983) (improper comment 
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III.  Reconciling Punishment with Forgiveness 
Those three doctrines—the reasonable-mistake exception to the 
exclusionary rule, the qualified-immunity doctrine, and the harmless-
error doctrine—pose an interesting question when placed side-by-side 
with the common law no-mistake rule: Why does the law forgive the 
government’s mistakes, but not ones made by a private party? 
Consider the contrast in the type of treatment that the law affords 
government officials and private parties. If a police officer makes a rea-
sonable mistake, he does not lose his case or his home; the evidence he 
acquired can be used at a trial of a suspect to establish his guilt. If the 
prosecutor or judge makes a reasonable mistake at his trial, an appellate 
court will uphold the defendant’s conviction. Additionally, a suspect or 
defendant cannot successfully sue the officer, the prosecutor, or the 
judge for damages even if one of them makes a mistake.111 By contrast, 
if that same suspect made a reasonable mistake in believing that his 
actions were lawful—a mistake that any reasonable person would have 
made—he still can be sent to prison.  To add insult to injury, the pros-
ecution perhaps can use against him the evidence obtained by the very 
officer who violated the Fourth Amendment in the course of investi-
gating the case. 
 
on defendant’s silence at trial, in violation of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause); 
Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 613–14 (1982) (statute improperly forbidding court from giving 
a jury instruction on a lesser included offense in a capital case, in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (failure to instruct 
the jury on the presumption of innocence); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (admission 
of identification in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Brown v. United States, 
411 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1973) (admission of out-of-court statement in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (admission of 
confession in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U.S. 42, 52–53 (1970) (admission of evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment); Cole-
man v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (denial of right to counsel at a preliminary hearing in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause). 
 111.  It is even more difficult for a plaintiff to sue a judge than a police officer or prosecutor. 
Judges can invoke absolute immunity for all actions taken in the exercise of their judicial function 
regarding matters over which they have jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) 
(collecting cases); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
335 (1871). 
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This variance in the law’s treatment of mistakes requires a justifi-
cation. Elementary principles of fairness, to say nothing of the Consti-
tution, demand an explanation for the dissimilar treatment of facially 
similar people. Indeed, as Professor John Ely explained, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause often works best when it is used to force the govern-
ment to justify why one party is treated differently than another.112 
Here, the courts bear the burden of justification. Neither Congress nor 
the Executive Branch has the responsibility for stating what the law is. 
That chore falls to the judiciary.113 Moreover, it is the courts that have 
rejected a mistake-of-law defense for private parties while creating the 
three reasonable-mistake doctrines noted above for federal officials. 
Accordingly, in deciding whether this disparate treatment can be jus-
tified, it is important to examine the reasons the courts have given for 
each doctrine and to see whether they justify this apparent discrimina-
tion. 
A.  Examining the Rationales for the Different Rules 
What do the rationales that the Supreme Court has accepted for 
creating the reasonable-mistake, qualified-immunity, and harmless-er-
ror doctrines have to say about creating a mistake-of-law defense? 
How do they compare with the rationales offered to defend the prop-
osition that a reasonable, good faith, mistake of law should not excul-
pate a member of the public? Let us answer those questions by walking 
through the rationales for the no-mistake rule. 
1.  Everyone knows the criminal law 
The first and oldest rationale is that everyone knows the criminal 
law.114 It is difficult to believe, however, that supporters of the no-mis-
take rule would offer that justification today. As an empirical proposi-
tion, that defense is risible. There are more than 4,000 federal statutes 
 
 112.  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 125–31 (1980). 
 113.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 114.  See, e.g., Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 738–59; Cass, supra note 8, at 689–95. 
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alone that potentially create criminal liability,115 and that number turns 
out to be a paltry sum. Empowering administrative agencies to define 
the criminal law116 has resulted in more than 300,000 potentially rele-
vant implementing federal regulations.117 Perhaps, that number might 
not be so overwhelming if the criminal code was patterned after prin-
ciples of contemporary morality—assuming, of course, that those prin-
ciples were widely understood. But there is no such match.118 Use of 
the criminal law to regulate a modern industrial economy has the effect 
of disconnecting the penal code from moral precepts. This means that 
the latter do not invariably offer principles or rules of thumb to use in 
order to avoid breaking the law.119 Atop that, lawyers and law profes-
sors do not know all of the criminal laws,120 so it is unreasonable to 
expect the average layman to know them. The coup de grace is that even 
the authors who defend the no-mistake rule admit that this rationale is 
unjustifiable.121 
Therefore, the first rationale, that everyone knows the criminal 
law, cannot stand on its own today. It also turns out even more poorly 
when compared with the rationale for the reasonable-mistake, quali-
fied-immunity, and harmless-error doctrines. The law is far more for-
giving in connection with those doctrines. Ironically, the reasons given 
for that attitude readily justify a mistake-of-law defense. 
The law does not presume that every federal official knows all of 
the rules governing the pretrial or trial stages of the criminal process. 
The empirical premise underlying those doctrines is that federal offi-
cials will make mistakes because they do not know what every principle 
 
 115.  See, e.g., Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 739–40. 
 116.  Agencies cannot enact laws, but they can fill in the blanks that Congress left for them 
in statutes. See Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167 (1991) (holding that Congress can 
delegate to the Attorney General the authority to list controlled substances); Yakus v. United 
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding statute that made violations of the price administrator’s 
regulations an offense); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (Congress can delegate 
authority to an administrative agency to promulgate regulations whose violation is punishable as 
a crime). 
 117.  See, e.g., Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 739–40. 
 118.  See FLETCHER, supra note 23, § 9.3, at 731–32. 
 119.  See Meese & Larkin, supra note 5 at 738–59. 
 120.  See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 24, at 1881; supra note 24 (collecting authorities). 
 121.  See supra note 24. 
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of law may be or how it should be applied to every new case. The moral 
premise underlying those doctrines is that a strict, unyielding, unfor-
giving application of the law is too costly for society to bear. Yes, gov-
ernment officials must follow the law or else we will have tyranny. But, 
gee, everybody makes mistakes now and then. We should be willing to 
recognize the human fallibility of individuals doing their best to com-
ply with the law while doing their jobs. Fastidious attention to ever-
changing details only penalizes law enforcement officials—who are, af-
ter all, just average fellows like the rest of us—from doing their job. 
The law should grant government officials “breathing room to make 
reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and penalize only the ones who 
are either “plainly incompetent” or “knowingly violate the law.”122  
Only when the government willfully violates the law, or when there 
has been an egregious violation of a party’s rights, should the courts 
impose a remedy on government officials who act unlawfully. A rea-
sonable-mistake rule is good enough for government work. 
One could substitute “private party” for “government official” in 
that line of reasoning without losing anything in the translation. Pri-
vate parties and law enforcement officials both can act reasonably; both 
can make mistakes; and both can benefit from the forgiveness that the 
law currently affords only parties in the latter group. If so, there is an 
obvious tension between the propositions that (1) every private party 
knows every criminal law in whatever form it may take, and (2) no law 
enforcement officer can be expected to know all of the laws governing 
his job. 
The courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have decided a legion 
of cases that have created those two separate, facially inconsistent 
propositions without once trying to reconcile them or even acknowl-
edging that this disparity exists. The need to decide cases narrowly, so 
as not to foreclose unanticipated applications of new legal rules, may 
explain why the courts have not recognized this anomaly, but that 
practical necessity does not justify it. The law seeks to treat like cases 
in a like manner to ensure that justice is blind between the parties. 
 
 122.  Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244–45 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011), and Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)) (internal 
punctuation omitted from Messerschmidt). 
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Their identity should be irrelevant; all that should matter is the argu-
ment for and against a particular judgment or legal principle. If so, the 
law should treat private individuals engaged in non-law enforcement 
undertakings with the same consideration for human fallibility that the 
law affords government officials. 
To be certain, if there is a powerful reason to treat the latter (or 
the former) in a better (or worse) manner, discriminatory treatment 
would be justified. But that difference first would need to be acknowl-
edged and then defended. It would be no defense to say that govern-
ment officials, even police officers, are categorically different moral in-
dividuals than the rest of us, demanding that a different set of moral 
rules should apply to them. It also would be deeply insulting to law 
enforcement officers to defend the difference on the ground that they 
lack the intellectual capability to learn the rules governing their pro-
fession. The same types of individuals who pursue careers in law en-
forcement may follow career paths that take them into business, one 
of the other professions (e.g., law, accounting), journalism, or another 
equally legitimate, equally beneficial, equally noble, and equally (if not 
more so) intellectually demanding line of work.123 
The distinction that the law currently draws between any and every 
person in a law enforcement position and any and every person on the 
other side of “the thin blue line” is arbitrary, unless it can be sustained 
on legitimate, rational, and socially beneficial grounds.124 The ra-
tionale ordinarily given for the common law no-mistake rule cannot 
satisfy that test. If we are willing to accept the proposition that no gov-
ernment official, including those involved in law enforcement, can be 
expected to know the law, we must be willing to recognize that no pri-
vate party can have that knowledge either. The same people populate 
 
 123.  Some people spend time on each side of that line throughout their lives. For example, 
Louis Freeh was an FBI agent, a prosecutor, a judge, and FBI Director, before entering business. 
Edward Conlon graduated from Harvard to join the family business on the NYPD. Robert Daley 
was a journalist and Deputy New York City Police Commissioner. See EDWARD CONLON, BLUE 
BLOOD (2004); ROBERT DALEY, TARGET BLUE: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE N.Y.P.D. (1974); 
LOUIS J. FREEH, MY FBI: BRINGING DOWN THE MAFIA, INVESTIGATING BILL CLINTON, AND 
FIGHTING THE WAR ON TERROR (2005). Morally and intellectually speaking, they neither 
gained nor lost anything when they changed positions. 
 124.  I will address below the claim that the law enforcement profession is inherently dif-
ferent from all others. 
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each category, and regardless of the type and amount of training that 
we give the people in one category or the other, they still will make 
mistakes. Therefore, we should not treat every government official in 
a categorically different manner than people who pursue other careers. 
So much for the proposition that everyone knows the law. 
2.  Everyone should know the criminal law 
Defenders of the common law no-mistake rule will argue, how-
ever, that the rule has an added benefit: encouraging people to learn 
what the law forbids. Perhaps every individual cannot know every stat-
ute, regulation, and judicial decision defining the parameters and con-
tent of the penal code, but every person should be encouraged to learn 
those metes and bounds. A mistake-of-law rule would create a disin-
centive to keep abreast of developments in the law due to the fear that 
knowledge would sink this defense and, what is worse, would promote 
(and shelter) willful blindness. The result would allow phony defenses 
to perpetuate themselves. Surely, we want to encourage corporations 
to know what they may and may not do, especially given the potential 
catastrophes that a modern industrial society can wreak on public 
health and the environment.125 A mistake-of-law rule, therefore, would 
lead to far more cases of injustice than are created by the no-mistake 
rule.126 
Knowledge of the law is socially valuable and should be encour-
aged, but it is valuable for everyone, including government officials. In-
deed, it is especially important for government officials to know what 
the law permits and forbids because only government officials can in-
voke state power against private parties, such as the unmatched power 
to arrest and punish for crime. The reason that the Constitution does 
not apply to private conduct is that the Framers feared the power of 
 
 125.  See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–
96 (1909) (the harms that corporations can cause society justifies subjecting them to the criminal 
law). 
 126. See Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833) (“[There is] extreme 
danger of allowing such excuses to be set up for illegal acts to the detriment of the public. There 
is scarcely any law which does not admit of some ingenious doubt, and there would be perpetual 
temptations to violations of the laws, if men were not put upon extreme vigilance to avoid them.”); 
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *45, *46; HOLMES, supra note 12, at 48–49. 
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the English crown, not that of their neighbors. The Framers sought to 
ensure, through a system of separated federal powers, decentralized 
state authority, and specific legal guarantees, that the newly created 
federal government never would be able to assume the same powers 
over the public that the English monarchs enjoyed over the people in 
Great Britain. Americans would be “citizens,” not “subjects,” and our 
government would be “a government of laws, and not of men.”127 If 
anything, the law should impose a stricter obligation on government 
officials than on private parties. At a minimum, the law should treat 
their reasonable mistakes in the same manner. 
As for corporations: A corporation is an artificial entity that can act 
only through officers and employees.128 A mistake-of-law defense seeks 
to enable morally blameless individuals honestly trying to comply with 
the law from being convicted and punished for actions that no reason-
able person would know to be a crime without having a lawyer at his 
elbow. The average person does not have the luxury of such readily 
available legal advice. That fact is critical. The law must be clear to 
“men of common intelligence”129—not lawyers of common intelli-
gence—in order for it to be valid.130 The law assumes that the average 
person lacks legal training. By contrast, some corporations have large 
legal departments staffed with lawyers who can offer advice if and 
whenever the company needs it. Individuals need a mistake-of-law de-
fense. Corporations may not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 127.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 128.  See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 
(1819) (“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contempla-
tion of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter 
of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”). 
 129.  Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (discussing the void-for-
vagueness doctrine). 
 130.  See Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 781–82. 
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3.  Necessity 
A third defense of the no-mistake rule is necessity. The argument 
is that permitting a mistake-of-law defense would cripple law enforce-
ment.131  The defense puts the government at a terrible disadvantage 
because a defendant can always disavow any knowledge of the law and 
fend off the government’s questions by standing on his self-incrimina-
tion privilege.132 Thus, a defendant could use a phony mistake-of-law 
defense to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt and win an acquittal. 
Both because a mistake defense upsets the balance between the parties 
and because the law should always “keep the balance true,”133 the mis-
take-of-law defense should be rejected. 
 
The necessity rationale is a more defensible bulwark for the no-
mistake rule than the first two, but it is still insufficient. First, the law 
excuses errors by police officers, government employees, and judges 
only if they are reasonable. A mistake-of-law defense should have the 
 
 131.  See Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833) (recognizing the princi-
ple that mistake of law is not an excuse “results from the extreme difficulty of ascertaining what 
is, bona fide, the interpretation of the party. . . .”); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *46; 1 
WHARTON, supra note 12, at § 399; Herbert L. Packer, supra note 26, at 109. As Holmes ex-
plained: 
The true explanation of the rule is the same as that which accounts for the law’s indif-
ference to a man’s particular temperament, faculties, and so forth. Public policy sacri-
fices the individual to the general good. It is desirable that the burden of all should be 
equal, but it is still more desirable to put an end to robbery and murder. It is no doubt 
true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have known that he was 
breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where 
the law-maker has determined to make men know and obey, and justice to the indi-
vidual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales. 
HOLMES, supra note 12, at 48; see also AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 483 (“[I]f ignorance of law were a 
ground of exemption, the administration of justice would be arrested. For, in almost every case, 
ignorance of the law would be alleged. And, for the purpose of determining the reality and ascer-
taining the cause of the ignorance, the Court were [sic] compelled to enter upon questions of fact, 
insoluble and interminable.”). 
 132.  HART, supra note 19, at 77. 
 133.  Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934), overruled in part by Malloy v. Ho-
gan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
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same limitation.134 A properly defined mistake-of-law defense would 
exonerate a defendant only if he reasonably and honestly believed that 
the law did not make his conduct a crime. No jury would find that a 
defendant reasonably and honestly believed that he could murder, 
rape, rob, steal, and swindle others. In fact, the laws prohibiting that 
conduct are so deeply entrenched into American mores that no judge 
or jury could find such a claim credible.135 As a result, a trial judge 
would not be obliged even to instruct the jury on that defense in such 
a case.136 A “reasonableness” requirement would go a long way toward 
cutting off fraudulent use of a mistake-of-law defense.137 
There is also no need to sacrifice an honest defendant in order to 
stave off an acquittal of a dishonest one if there are satisfactory alter-
natives to foreclosing all mistake-of-law defenses.138 The Supreme 
Court has said that, in connection with the exclusionary rule, the 
 
 134.  See Larkin, supra note 23. 
 135.  See FLETCHER, supra note 23, § 1.1.1, at 4 (“[L]arceny is one of the primordial crimes 
of Western culture.”) (footnote omitted); FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 108–09 (“Perhaps the 
most primitive and basic rules in the criminal justice system were those that protected property 
rights. . . . The laws against theft, larceny, embezzlement, and fraud are familiar friends. People 
may not know every technical detail, but they get the general point. Probably all human commu-
nities punish theft in one way or another; it is hard to imagine a society that does not have a 
concept of thievery, and some way to punish people who help themselves to things that ‘belong’ 
to somebody else.”); John Gardner, The Wrongfulness of Rape, in OFFENCES AND DEFENCES 1 
(2007) (explaining that rape is an offense that is outlawed everywhere); Larkin, supra note 23, at 
16; SALMOND, supra note 9, at 427; Mark D. Yochum, The Death of a Maxim: Ignorance of Law Is 
No Excuse (Killed by Money, Guns and a Little Sex), 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEG. COM. 635, 636 (1999) 
(“[E]vil is fundamentally known. . . . Ignorance that murder is a crime is no excuse for the crime 
of murder.”). 
 136.  See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414–15 (1980) (explaining that a district 
court should not instruct the jury on a defense that is not supported by the facts). 
 137.  See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 23, at 235; JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW § 1301, at 168–70 (5th ed. 2009). The same reasonableness requirement also 
supplies a complete answer to the claim that a defendant could use this defense to escape liability 
if he believed that foreign law or custom justified his actions. See Note, The Cultural Defense in 
the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986) (proposing such a defense). Intertribal retalia-
tion may be standard fare elsewhere, but we do not allow feuding between New York and Boston 
fans because the Giants beat the Patriots in the 2012 Super Bowl. 
 138.  See HOLMES, supra note 12, at 45 (“If justice requires the fact to be ascertained, the 
difficulty of doing so is no ground for refusing to try . . . unless we are justified in sacrificing 
individuals to public convenience.”). 
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courts should be mindful of alternatives to suppression that would pro-
vide an ample opportunity to remedy a police officer’s mistake, such as 
a civil damages action or internal disciplinary review.139 The same need 
to consider alternatives exists here. As a practical matter, a defendant 
will need to testify at trial in order to persuade the jury that he did not 
know that his conduct was prohibited. A defendant could try to support 
that defense in other ways, but it would be difficult to make a convinc-
ing case that he lacked knowledge of the law without testifying to that 
fact. Once the defendant takes the stand, he is subject to cross-exami-
nation.140 The prosecution, therefore, will have ample opportunity to 
demonstrate that the defendant is a liar,141 and jury will be able to de-
cide whether the defendant is telling the truth by what he says and how 
he says it.142  Furthermore, if Congress were concerned that a defend-
ant could still easily, although illegitimately, raise a reasonable doubt 
as to his knowledge of the law, Congress could impose the burden of 
proof on the defendant.143 Those safeguards should be sufficient to en-
able the government to defeat a fraudulent defense. 
 
 139.  See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596–98 (2006). 
 140.  See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154–55 (1958) (“[If] a defendant in a crim-
inal case . . . takes the stand and testifies in his own defense[,] his credibility may be impeached 
and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is deter-
mined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. He has no right to set forth to the jury all the 
facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those 
facts.”) (citation omitted); Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900) (“Where an 
accused party waives his constitutional privilege of silence, takes the stand in his own behalf and 
makes his own statement, it is clear that the prosecution has a right to cross-examine him upon 
such statement with the same latitude as would be exercised in the case of an ordinary witness, as 
to the circumstances connecting him with the alleged crime.”). 
 141.  To aid the prosecution in this regard, Congress can require the defendant to provide 
notice before trial of his intent to assert a mistake-of-law defense. The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure impose that duty on a defendant in connection with the defenses of alibi, insanity, or 
reliance on an official interpretation of the law. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1–12.3. A pre-trial notice 
requirement, moreover, does not violate the defendant’s Self-Incrimination Privilege. See Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82–86 (1970) (rejecting a self-incrimination claim in the context of 
a notice-of-alibi requirement). 
 142.  See HOLMES, supra note 12, at 45 (“[N]ow that parties can testify, it may be doubted 
whether a man’s knowledge of the law is any harder to investigate than many questions which are 
gone into.”). 
 143.  See HOLMES, supra note 12, at 45 (“The difficulty, such as it is, would be met by 
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B.  Comparing Apples with Apples or with Oranges? 
The final response approaches this issue from a different direction. 
The argument would state that the foregoing analysis is entirely mis-
guided because it amounts to comparing apples and oranges.144 The 
exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence obtained by 
private parties,145 so the reasonable-mistake exception is immaterial.  
The qualified-immunity doctrine does not apply to the actions of pri-
vate parties,146 so it too, is irrelevant. And the harmless-error doctrine 
by definition is limited to errors underlying an action that can only be 
taken by a government agent—the entry of judgment by a court.147 
The purpose of each doctrine is to benefit the public by avoiding the 
costs that come from treating every mistake as fatal: the exclusion of 
reliable, incriminating proof of the defendant’s guilt; the refusal of tal-
ented candidates for public service to accept such positions due to the 
fear of damages liability or the burden of defending against lawsuits; 
and the holding of a pointless retrial of a fairly convicted defendant 
just to have a mistake-free repeat performance. The rationales given 
to avoid those costs are not transferrable to the case of private parties. 
There will always be information costs involved in knowing what the 
law forbids, but that is just the cost of living in a society protected by 
the rule of law. It is not too stiff a price to pay for the benefits of having 
federal, state, and local governments provide public goods—such as a 
 
throwing the burden of proving ignorance on the law-breaker.”); see also, e.g., Smith v. United 
States, 113 S. Ct. 714, 719 (2013) (ruling that the defendant can be made to bear the burden of 
proof on withdrawal from a conspiracy); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (same rule for self-
defense); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (same rule for the defense of acting out of 
an extreme emotional disturbance); cf. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 510 (1983) (collect-
ing cases ruling that defendant can be made to bear the burden of production). 
 144.  In fact, the argument would be that the Supreme Court has used that precise meta-
phor to describe this mistaken analogy. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 166 n.2 (1992) (“In 
arguing that respondents [viz., private parties] are entitled to qualified immunity under Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the dissent mixes apples and oranges.”). 
 145.  Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 
465, 475–76 (1921). 
 146.  Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 166–69. 
 147.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 
(1946). 
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criminal justice system—that a private market cannot provide in an ef-
ficient manner.148 Doctrines designed to enable the government to 
function efficiently are of no relevance when private parties operate 
without using state power. 
Moreover, none of the three doctrines noted above has any bearing 
on the proper definition of the criminal law. The law does not treat 
actors in the criminal justice system more favorably than others when 
it comes to the substantive rules of criminal law. The same rules gov-
erning murder, robbery, fraud, and the like apply equally to cops on 
the beat and the people in the neighborhoods they patrol. Yes, the 
rules of evidence and criminal procedure may differ in the case of gov-
ernment officials, but that is due to the unremarkable proposition that 
the Constitution applies only to them and to the undeniable fact that 
we want government officials aggressively to enforce the criminal law. 
Neither of those considerations, however, detracts from the proposi-
tion that the substantive criminal law does not show any leniency for 
law enforcement officers in the exercise of their responsibilities. The 
rules of evidence and criminal procedure may recognize a difference 
between the mistakes that Joe Friday and John Q. Public make, but 
they operate under the same substantive rules of criminal law and are 
exposed to the same criminal and tort liability when they cross over 
the line. 
Finally, any benefit that the law confers on law enforcement offi-
cials is both desirable and earned. Police officers are “the foot soldiers 
of an ordered society.”149 They are responsible for the oftentimes dan-
gerous and always stressful job of enforcing the law and preserving 
community order. The police deal with the lowest ranks of society—
murderers, thieves, child molesters, and so forth—and with otherwise 
good people during the worst times of their lives. They earn each day 
whatever breaks the procedural or substantive criminal law affords 
them as a legitimate, reasonable recompense for the dirty chores that 
we assign to them. 
Those arguments are formidable, but ultimately unpersuasive. 
 
 148.  See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 223–37 (4th 
ed. 2007) (positing that private markets do not reliably produce the proper amount of public 
goods). 
 149.  Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 642 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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First, the premise is flawed. The Supreme Court has drawn a par-
allel between the doctrines noted above and the substantive criminal 
law. That is the lesson of United States v. Lanier.150 Lanier involved the 
prosecution of a state court judge under Section 242 of Title 18 for 
violating the constitutional rights of women by using his state author-
ity to carry out sexual assaults. Section 242, the modern-day version of 
three Reconstruction Era federal civil rights laws,151 makes it a federal 
offense to deprive a person, under color of state law, of “any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or 
laws of the United States . . .”152 The question before the Court in-
volved the proper construction of Section 242; in particular, how that 
law should be construed in order to ensure that its interpretation pro-
vided “fair warning . . . in language that the common world will un-
derstand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.”153 
The Court reasoned that Section 242 is sufficiently clear as long as the 
text of the Constitution, or decisions interpreting those terms, have 
made “specific” the right that the accused allegedly violated.154 The 
Harlow qualified-immunity standard enables courts to determine 
whether a particular right is sufficiently “specific.”155 The Harlow qual-
ified-immunity standard, the Court explained, provides adequate no-
tice for state officials of what constitutes a crime and enables courts 
readily to decide when criminal liability is proper.156 
 
 150.  United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997). 
 151.  Id. at 264 n.1. 
 152.  18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012). 
 153.  Lanier, 520 U.S. at 265 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)). 
 154.  Id. at 267 (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945)). 
 155.  Id. at 270–71 (citing, inter alia, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), and 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)). 
 156.  As the Supreme Court explained in Lanier: 
In the civil sphere, we have explained that qualified immunity seeks to ensure that 
defendants reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability by 
attaching liability only if the contours of the right [violated are] sufficiently clear that 
a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. So 
conceived, the object of the “clearly established immunity standard is not different 
from that of fair warning as it relates to law made specific for the purpose of validly 
applying § 242. The fact that one has a civil and the other a criminal law role is of no 
significance; both serve the same objective, and in effect the qualified immunity test is 
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That link is significant because the mistake-of-law defense also 
serves the purpose of ensuring that the criminal law affords parties ad-
equate notice of what the law forbids. That problem is particularly 
acute in the twenty-first century because of the proliferation of crimi-
nal laws and the use of regulations to define terms in criminal statutes 
or even to outlaw conduct itself.157 Private parties are entitled to the 
same notice as government officials where the lines are drawn defining 
crimes. If government officials can make reasonable mistakes without 
winding up in the hoosegow, private parties should receive the same 
protection. 
It is true that, in some instances, the criminal law does treat law 
enforcement officers differently from average members of the pub-
lic.158 A police officer may use force to make an arrest, force that oth-
erwise would be deemed a battery,159 or to execute a search that other-
wise would be deemed a trespass.160 A law enforcement officer also may 
 
simply the adaptation of the fair warning standard to give officials (and, ultimately, 
governments) the same protection from civil liability and its consequences that indi-
viduals have traditionally possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes. To require 
something clearer than clearly established would, then, call for something beyond fair 
warning. 
Lanier, 520 U.S. at 270–71 (citations and internal punctuation omitted except for bracketed ma-
terial). 
 157.  See Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 734–35, 739–41. 
 158.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 351, 3052, 3107 (2012); 28 U.S.C. §§ 533, 540, 540A, 540B (2012); 
50 U.S.C. §§ 401–04, 1801–63 (2012) (authority of FBI agents); 28 U.S.C. §§ 561, 564, 566 
(authority of U.S. and Deputy U.S. Marshals); 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (authority of Secret Service 
agents). 
 159.  See John Baker Waite, The Law of Arrest, 24 TEX. L. REV. 279 (1946); LAFAVE, supra 
note 3, § 10.7, at 590–600; Rollin M. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201 (1940). 
 160.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2012) (“The officer may break open any outer or inner door or 
window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, 
after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate 
himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.”). The criminal law also protects 
officers when they conduct a search or seizure. See 18 U.S.C. § 2231 (2012) (“Whoever forcibly 
assaults, resists, opposes, prevents, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person authorized 
to serve or execute search warrants or to make searches and seizures while engaged in the perfor-
mance of his duties with regard thereto or on account of the performance of such duties, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both . . . .”). 
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use deadly force in settings unavailable to civilians.161 We grant law 
enforcement officials that authority, however, not because they or the 
positions they hold are privileged. The Constitution expressly rejects 
that notion.162 We delegate to them the authority they need to perform 
the responsibilities we give them.  The powers of office are not like 
property that can be possessed indefinitely. Those powers are entirely 
instrumental and functional. They have a finite half-life, one that ex-
pires when a person leaves office. Once a law enforcement official 
leaves the government, he leaves behind whatever power the govern-
ment delegated to him. A former federal law enforcement officer may  
not entirely be like Cincinnatus, but he does become a civilian when 
he returns to civilian life. 
At the end of the day, the discrimination between government of-
ficials and private parties cannot be justified. The remedy, however, 
does not require that government officials and the public forfeit the 
benefit of the three doctrines discussed above. There is more than one 
remedy for a case of discrimination. The law can extend a benefit to 
everyone, rather than take it away from the favored class. Here, the 
proper remedy is to grant private parties the same forgiveness that we 
already afford government officials. The reasonable-mistake, quali-
fied-immunity, and harmless-error doctrines serve important social 
goals. The law is sounder today than it was before the Supreme Court 
created those doctrines. We do not need to scuttle any one of them, 
and we should not take that step. The soundest remedy is simply to 
recognize that private parties deserve the same mercy that our govern-
ment officials already enjoy. 
 
 
 161.  See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (discussing Fourth Amendment limita-
tions in the context of a high-speed chase for the purpose of making an arrest); Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (discussing Fourth Amendment limitations in the context of the use 
of deadly force to stop a fleeing suspect). 
 162.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No title of nobility shall be granted by the United 
States: And no person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Con-
sent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, 
from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”). 
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IV.  Conclusion 
There are two very different mistake doctrines in the law. The 
common law doctrine that ignorance of the law is no excuse gives no 
weight to reasonable, good faith mistakes insofar as criminal liability is 
concerned. By contrast, three related lines of decisions—the reasona-
ble-mistake, qualified-immunity, and harmless-error doctrines—ex-
press great willingness to overlook reasonable, good faith mistakes that 
police officers, prosecutors, and judges make. That discrimination is 
unwarranted. There is no good reason to treat private parties system-
atically worse than public officials in this regard. The courts have cre-
ated these competing lines of decisions, and they, or Congress, should 
eliminate that discrimination by extending to members of the public 
the same grace that they offer to every government official. The most 
straightforward way to remedy this problem is to recognize a mistake-
of-law defense in the substantive criminal law. 
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